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In many African nations, the fiscal balance is  growth, and low generation of revenue.
extremely fragile, so fiscal restraint is necessary
for stabilization and adjustment efforts to  Fiscal deficits drove real exchange rates up
succeed.  in the late 1970s and early 1980s  - and fiscal
policy should now facilitate real depreciation
Governments tend to increase public expen-  adjustment by pulling deficits down.
ditures when export commodity revenues are
high - and maintain public spending even after  External aid has often supported unsustain-
revenues fall. This is a formula for building  able fiscal policy. Far from lessening the need
unmanageable debt. Botswana and Cameroon,  for strictural adjustment, it should now be used
which exercised restraint during boom times, are  for rehabilitation and infrastructure develop-
exceptions to the rule in Africa.  ment.
Inflation, driven by public spending, has  Market-oriented exchange rates are not a
serious consequences such as the erosion of the  substitute for fiscal restraint, but a complement.
real value of taxes, adding to public deficits.  Flexible rates alone failed in Zambia and Sierra
However, attempts to reduce inflation through  Leone. Combined with prior fiscal restraint,
fiscal austerity may have undesirable side  however, they succeeded in Ghana.
effects, if austerity is pursued in the wrong way
when public sector real wages are driven down  This is a background paper for the 1988
below subsistence, productivity is reduced.  World Development Report.  Copies are avail-
able free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
Low public sector productivity results in  NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact
poor delivery of human services, the deteriora-  Rhoda Blade-Charest, room S 13-060, extension
tion of infrastructure, hindering economic  33754.
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As did  the  rest  of the  developing  world,  low-income  African  countries
borrowed  heavily  (though  mainly  from  noncommercial  sources)  in the  period
after  1975  to finance  consumption  and  domestlc  capital  formation  in the  face
of adverse  terms  of trade  shocks  and  weak growth  in  export  demand  from  the
developed  countries. This  borrow-ag  not  only  helped  smooth  out  absorption  in
the  face  of temporary  income  shortfalls,  but  also  allowed  aL number  of
countries  to  maintain  macroeconomic  and  sectoral  policies  that  by the  early
1980s  appeared  unsustainable  in  the long  run (World  Bank,  1981). When
financial  inflows  dried  up in the  early  1980.,  in the  middle  of a  sustained
slump  in commodities  prices  and  at the  onset  of a drought  that  affected  large
parts  of the  region,  many countries  were forced  to face  the  reality  that
existing  levels  of absorption  were  no longer  sustainable  even  in the  short
run. The  adjustment  to this  reality  has  been  harsh. Table  1 summarizes  the
extremely  poor  macroeconomic  performance  of sub-Saharan  Africa  in the  19809,
both in  absolute  terms  and relative  to the  rest  of the  developing  wo%ld.
This  paper  reviews  the  literature  and  country  experience  on the
macroeconomics  of fiscal  policy  in  low-income  Africa. 3 Given  the  experience
of the  19708  and  80s,  the  ultimate  focus  of the  discussion  must be the
interaction  of fiscal  policy  with the  challenges  of stabilization  and
structural  adjustment.  Two  dominant  themes  emerge  for  fiscal  policy. The
first  is the  importance  of overall  fiscal  restraint  as a  precondition  for
3  The  paper  draws  on unpublished  World  Bank  material  on the  following
countries%  Botswana,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Sierra  Leone,  Tanzania,
Zaire,  and  Zambia. With the  exception  of Botswana  and  Cote  d'Ivoire,  these
countries  are  all in  the  World  Bank's  category  of 'Low-income,  (per  capita
income  below  $400  in  1985). Botswana  and  Cote  d'lvoire,  with per capita
incomes  of $840  and  $660.  respectively,  are  classified  as ZMiddle-income.
1success  of stabilization  and  structural  adjustment  efforts. The second  is the
importance  of improved  public  sector  performance  in  delivering  infrastructural
services.
It  goes  with the territory  in SSA  that  these  themes  should  pose  a
difficult  dilemma:  how  can fiscal  restraint  be achieved  when basic  government
services  are in  disarray  and  the  stock  cf social  overhead  capital  is  badly
depreciated? The  answer  is  that  the  government  can improve  both its  own  and
the  private  sector's  efficiency  by concentrating  its  efforts  on revenue
mobilization,  rehabilitation  of infrastructure  (e.g.,  roads),  and  the  delivery
of basic  human  services  (e.g.,  education  and  health),  while reducing  its
presence  'n  other  areas  of the  economy. This  is  a  me tum term  prospect,
howevert  in  most cases,  even  the  most ambitious  pub  ictor  program  will  not
be able to resolve the dilemma without substantial iJ''us  in the form of aid
and  debt reschedulings.
The  paper  is  organized  as follows. Section  2 provides  background  on the
characteristics  of fiscal  policy  in  SSA.  Section  3 studies  structural
problems  of fiscal  management  that  are  due  to economic  and  political
considerations.  Section  4  considers  fiscal  policv  in  the  light  of  structural
adjustment  problems,  particularly  $cith  reference  to  the  effect  of  fiscal
policy  on  the  real  exchange  rate. Section  5  discusses  the  role  of  fiscal
policy  in  stabilization.  Section  6  concludes.
2. Some  Featuree  of  Fiscal  Policy  in  SSA
This  section  describes  some  of  the  characteristics  of  fiscal  policy  in
SSA  as  background  to  the  rest  of  the  paper.  Table  2  gives  some  indication  of
size  of  the  central  government  and  basic  sources  of  revenue  in  SSA. While  the
2average  ratio  of taxes  to  GDP  among  countries  in  SSA is  typical  of the
developing  world,  these  countries  tend  to rely  more  heavily  on taxes  on
international  trade  and  less  heavily  on nontax  revenues  (e.g.,  user fees  and
other  cost recovery  mechanisms)  than  their  counterparts  outside  of  Africa.
Hodifications  of the tax  system  to reduce  its  distortionary  effects  are  an
important  component  of many structural  adjustment  programs  currently  underway
in SSA.
A  second  importcnt  characteristic  of fiscal  policy  in SSA  is  that it  is
in  principle  constrained  by the  lack  of other,  complementary  policy
instruments  that  can offset  its  undesireable  side  effects  at  low  social  cost.
In particular,  open  market  operations  are typically  unavailable  due  to the
lack  of a  well-developed  domestic  market  in  government  securities. 4 The
authorities  therefore  have limited  control  over  the  inflationary  or
reserve-depleting  impulse  (depending  on exchange  rate  regime)  of fiscal
deficits. Rather  than  enforce  conservatism  in the  use of fiscal  policy,
however,  this  situation  has often  meant  use  of foreign  borrowing  and
subsidiary  policy  instrumeuts  like  the  inflation  tax  and foreign  excharge
rationing  as  ways of maintaining  unsustainable  fiscal  policies  (Pinto,  1987).
In this light,  tighter  policy  constraints,  rather  than  looser,  have a  certain
virtue. The superior  growth  performance  of the  franc  zone  countries  over  the
1960s  and  70s (Bhatia, g.98s  Devarajan  and  de  Melo,  1987b)  raises  exactly  this
possibility. In these  countries,  while  the  nominal  exchange  rate  is  lost  as
4  While  some  countries  have recently  introduced  Treasury  bill  auctions
(e.g.,  Zambiat  September,  1985;  Zairet  April,  1983),  these  markets  are
extremely  thin.  Other  policy  instruments  that  affect  the  money  supply,  like
reserve  requirements,  discount  policy  or  credit  ceilings,  will remain  more
important  in  the  medium  term.
3policy  instrument,  currency  convertibility  and  limits  on  government  borrowing
from  the  union  help  impose  fiscal  discipline  by  removing  or  substantially
limiting  two  of  the  more  distortionary  instruments  for  financing  the  deficit
(exchange  rationing  and  the  inflation  tax). 5
A final  important  point  is  that  the  public  sector  in  much  of  low-income
Africa  operates  under  structural  constraints  that  reduce  the  ability  of  the
fiscal  balance  to  absorb  external  shocks.  Though  this  problem  is  the  focus  of
structural  adjustment  efforts  by  many  countries,  addressing  it  is  a  medium
term  prospect  at  best. In  the  interim,  the fragility'  of  the  fiscal  balance
underscores  the  need  to  develop  effective  measures  for  expenditure  control,  as
well  as  the  need  for  adjustment  packages  that  are  flexible  enough  not  to  rely
on  good  luck  with  respect  to  external  developments.  Sources  of  fragility  are
discussed  in  the  next  section.
3.  Fragilit;  of  the  Fiscal  Balance  in  SSA
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  give  a  precise  interpretation  to  the
notion  of  budgetary  fragility  alluded  to  at  the  end  of  the  previous  section. 6
Three  sources  of  fragility  seem  important  for  African  countries:  sensitivity
of  the  tax  base  to  inflation,  asymmetric  response  of  current  expenditures  to
S  The  Franc  Zone  (3r  CFA  Zone)  consists  of  two  monetary  unions  whose
currency  (the  CFA  franc)  is  tied  to  the  French  franc,  with  convertibility
guaranteed  by  the  French  Central  Bank. Of  the  countries  listed  in  footnote  3,
only  Cote  d'Ivoire  ie  in  the  CFA  Zone. Outside  of  the  Franc  Zone,  the  only
arrangement  with  similar  features  is  the  Scuth  African  Currency  Union  (SACU),
which  ties  the  currencies  of  Swaziland  and  Lesotho  to  the  South  African  rand.
6  I  am  grateful  to  John  Harris  for  a  helpful  conversation  on  the  topic
of  this  section.
4revenue  shocks,  and  sensitivity  of productivity  to  real  wages in  tho iublic
sector.
Consider  a country  that  begins  in  a steady  state  equilibrium  wtth full
employment  and (for  simplicity)  zero  output  growth. The  exchange  rate  is
depreciating  at a fixe4  e  of crawl  (this  may be zero)  that  is equal  to the
rate  of growth  of the  nominal  monetary  base  and  nontradeables  prices;  foreign
inflation  is zero. We then  have the  following  relationship  for  the  steady
state  non-interest  government  deficit  as a p.oportion  of GDP (see  the
Appendix)t
1)  d + (iddex  - if)  - mrh  +  r,
where  dex, f and  r are  the  ratios  of external  debt,  foreign  reserves,  and  the
inflow  of aid,  respectively  (all  measured  at the  official  exchenge  rate)  to
GDP,  d and  h are  the  non-interest  government  deficit  and  the  monetary  base  as
a  proportion  of  GDP. id  and  i are  the  interest  rates  on external  debt  and
international  reserves,  respectively,  and  i  is the  domestic  inflation  rate. I
have assumed  that  all  external  debt  is  held  by the  government,  and that  the
country  has its  own  Central  Bank. 7
Equation  (1)  emphasizes  that  sustainable  deficits  are limited  by the
ability  of the  government  to extract  finance  via foreign  aid  and  the inflation
tax.  Suppose  now that  the  only  financial  asset  available  to the  private
7  For  countries  in  the  Franc  Zone  or SACU,  steady  state  inflation  must
be equal  for  all  partners  in  the  monetary  union. Sustainable  deficit  levels
would  then  depend  on  how overall  seigniorage  revenues  for  the  union  were
distributed  among  the  members.
5Aector  is  domestic  money.3 Let  the  domestic  demand  for  real  balances  be a
Cagan-style  function  of  the  expected  rate  of  inflation:
(2)  h  - exp(-ad  ).  a  o.
Figure  1  shows  the  determination  of  steady  state  equilibrium.  The  curve
OM  incorporates  money  market  clearing  and  convergence  of  expectations  (we  -
P),  both  of  which  are  characteristices  of  the  steady  state;  it  is  the
inflation-tax  Laffer  curve'  (Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1985)).  Revenue  from  the
inflation  tax  is  maximized  at  h*,  where  the  elasticity  of  demand  for  the
monetary  base  is  unity.  The  DD  schedule  gives  the  total  amount  that  must  be
financed  through  the  inflation  tax  if  growth  in  real  money  demand  is  zero
(another  requirement  of  the  steady  state).  The  diagram  gives  a quick  check  of
sustainability  of  fiscal  requirements;  if  DD  lies  above  OM,  the  deficit  cannot
be  financed  in  the  steady  state  and  must  be  financed  in  the  short  run  through
reserve  decumulation,  foreign  borrowing,  or  increased  aid.
If  financing  requirements  are  sustainable,  there  will  be  two  steady  state
equilibria.  The  stability  properties  of  these  equilibria  depend  on  how
expectations  about  inflation  are  formed;  Figure  2 shows  the  dynamics  under
both  rational  and  adaptive  expectations.  In  the  rational  expectations  case,
the  high  inflation,  low  real  balances  equilibrium  is  stable  and  the  other
unstable.  In  the  adaptive  expectations  case,  we use  the  following  dynamics
fcr  expected  inflationt
8  Pinto  (1985,  1987)  studies  a  similar  models  in  which  domestic
residents  also  hold  foreign  currency  obtained  on  the  black  market.
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Figure  2 illustrates  the  case in  which  ab c 1, implying  a relatively  low  rate
of adaptation  of expectations  and/or  a relatively  low  inflation  elasticity  of
money  demand. In this  case,  the  rational  expe-tations  result  is reverseds  the
low  inflation  equilibrium  is  the  stable  one. 9
The long  run  unsustainability  of the  deficit  may  be t*mporarily  masked  in
various  ways,  even if it is impossible  to increase  the  ratio  of external  debt
to  GDP at the  margin. 10 A  government  that  finds  it difficult ; reduce  the
primary  deficit  may try  to cover  over the  inflationary  implications  by
reducing  the rate  of crawl  of the  exchange  rate  (or  equivalently,  by leaving
the  nominal  exchange  rate  fixed  as domestic  inflation  rises);  as the  exchange
rate  becomes  increasingly  overvalued,  the  government  will have  to tighten
import  and  foreign  exchange  controls  in order  to  protect  reserves. This
approach,  widely  followed  in  SSA since  the  mid-1970s,  simultaneously  tends  to
reduce  the  budgetary  bu:den  of the foreign  debt  and to  transfer  resources  from
exporters  via the  black  market  premium  on foreign  exchange  (Pinto  (1987)
analyzes  the  latter  point). But  as long  as  the  basic  deficit  remains
unsustainable,  these  policies  can  only  temporarily  defer  the  need for
adjustmeutt;  in fact,  their  palliative  effect  is gradually  eroded  as more
9  If ab > 1, the  rational  expectations  stability  results  are restored.
This  analysis  of the rational  expectations  and  adaptive  expectations  case  is
contained  in Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1985).
10  Arrears  and debt  restructurings  are  both  ways of increasing  the
debt/GDP  ratio;  they  have  been  widely  used  in SSA.  Brau (1986)  lists  66
restructurings  by 18 different  countries  in  SSA  between  1980  and 1985;  in
1986,  23 countrles  in SSA  had outstanding  arrears  (IMF,  1987,  p.18).
7economic  activity  is  driven  onto  parallel  markets. 11 In the  interim,  by
distorting  the  sectora.  allocation  of resources  and  thus  eroding  the  real  tax
base,  they  make the  inevitable  fiscal  adjustment  more severe.
A good  example  of this  sequence  of events  is-  Madagascar  in the  period
from  1977  to 1982.  The  1976-77  boom in  coffee  prices  helped  finance  a
ImAssi  public  investment  prgram^  (Jeanneney,  1986)  that  was introduced  along
with a  nationalization  of large  portions  of  the  domestic  industrial,
distribution,  and  banking  sectors. Expenditures  rose  substantially  and
remained  high as the  terms  of trade  collapsed. The  resulting  detertoration  k.
she  fiscal  balance  was financed  in the  short  term  by substantial  increa,As  in
both foreign  public  debt  and  domestic  credit;  the latter  grew  at an average
annual  rate  of 89 percent  between  1977  and  1980,  after  growing  at an  aver5rse
rate  of 44 percent  between  1975  and  1977.  By 1980,  the  country  had
accumulated  significant  arrears  and reserves  had shrunk  to less  than  a  week of
imports  of goods  and  services. The  money  stock  grew  rapidly  under  the
pressure  of domestic  credit  creation;  between  1979  and  1981,  the  annual  growth
of narrow  money  nearly  uripled  (from  10 to 28  percent). The  domestic
inflation  rate  followed  suit (14  to 31  percent),  and  the  real  exchange  rate
11  This  gradual  erosion  of the  effects  of controls  may  have  some
benefits  when the  controls  are  lifted,  since  the required  adjustment  of  prices
to scarcity  values  may  be smaller;  for  example,  the  stabilization  program
begun  in  April  1983 in  Ghana  involved  a 20001  depreciation  of the  official
exchange  rate  in the  first  two  years. Over the  same  period,  the  inflatLon
rate  fell from  901  to 201.  Domestic  prices  of traded  goods,  in  other  words,
apparently  already  incorporated  the  scarcity  premium  on foreign  exchange.
No-e  that  the  budget  deficit  as a proportion  of GDP fell  by 25Z  over  the  same
period.
8appreciated  by nearly  20  percent  in the  two-year  period. 12 By  mid-1981 9 the
government  replaced  the  annual  foreign  exchange  allocation  system  with a
weekly  system  and  tightened  exchange  contrels  in  an attempt  to  protect
reserves. These  moves led  to development  of a substantial  black  market  in
foreign  exchange  (Jeanneney,  1986,  p.184).
The following  subsections  (3.1  - 3.3)  analyze  more carefully  some  of the
structural  problems  that  tend  to give  rise  to fiscal  unsustainability  in  SSA.
3.1  Budgetary  Fragility:  The  Tan3i  Effect
Tanzi (1977)  pointed  out that  if  taxes  are  levied  in  nominal  terms  today
and  collected  in  nominal  terms  after  some  time  lag,  the  real  value  of the
taxes  will  have  been eroded  in the  interim  by any  domestic  inflation. Failure
to index  the  tax  system  for  collection  lags  of this  sort  can reduce  the
sustainable  steady  state  level  of expenditures.  This  is illustrated  by the
curves  DD'  and  zz in  Figure  2,  which  treat  the  real  primary  deficit,  d - (g  -
t),  as an inkreasing  function  of the inflation  rate:  d - d(Cf),  d'>0.  The
diagram  shows  a situation  that  is  unsustainable  precisely  because  of this
effect. In the  stable  lagged  adjustment  case (curve  zz),  reliance  on the
inflation  tax (by  the  early  1980i,  reserves  were exhausted  in  many SSA
countries  and  access  to international  borrowing  was zero  on the  margin)  will
lead  to steadily  rising  inflation  (e.g.,  the  path starting  at B). 13
12  Narrow  money  is  currency  plus  demand  deposits  of the  banking  system;
the  inflation  rate  Ai  the  change  in  the  GDP  deflator. All  data  are from  the
IMP  International  Financial  Statistics  Yearbook,  1987.
13  As has  been done  in Brazil,  indexation  of the  tax system  to domestic
prices  will  protect  the  real  deficit  from  collection  lags (while
simultaneously  removing,  the  fiscal  dividend  provided  by *bracket  creep",  which
9Collection  lags  are  one  source  of  a  Tanzi  effect  in  SSA;  in  fact,  Tanzi
(1982)  cites  administrative  difficulties  as  contributing  to  decreases  in
public  sector  revenues  in  the  period  1974-80  for  Ghana,  Sudan,  Tanzania  and
Zaire  (though  it  is  worth  noting  that  these  difficulties  need  not  be  directly
related  to  macro  policy).  There  are  other  sources  of  equivalent  interactions
between  domestic  inflation  and  the  real  deficit,  however.  One  of  the  most
common  in  SSA  occurs  when  countries  fix  the  nominal  exchange  rate  in  the  face
of  high  domestic  inflation;  the  resulting  real  overvaluation  tends  to  shrink
the  tax  base  by  driving  trade  onto  parallel  markets  (e.g.,  Ghana,  Tanzania)
and  production  into  the  nontradeables  sector.  The  artificially  low  domestic
currency  prices  of  traded  goods  associated  with  overvaluation  also  mean  a
direct  reduction  of  real  revenues  from  ad  valorem  trade  taxes.  Destabilizing
interactions  are  not  confined  to  episodes  of  overvaluation;  when  specific,
rather  than  ad  valorem  trade  taxes  are  used,  for  example,  the  effective  tax
rate  falls  as  the  nominal  exchange  rate  is  devalued  along  with  domestic
inflation  (e.g.,  Zaire).
Sierra  Leone  gives  a  good  example  of  the  interaction  of  tax  revenues  with
accelerating  inflation.  Between  1978/79  and  1980/81,  the  share  of  tax
revenues  in  GDP  averaged  15.2  percent,  only  slightly  below  the  average  for  all
African  countries  (cf.  Table  2). The  central  government  deficit  averaged  9.4
percent  of  GDP. Although  much  of  this  was  directly  financed  by  borrowing  from
the  domestic  banking  sector,  the  nominal  monetary  base  grew  relatively  slowly,
averaging  18  percent  a  year  from  1978  to  1981. The  deficits  were  therefore
ultimately  financed  externally,  as  the  central  bank  borrowed  to  protect
may  dominate  at  low  levels  of  inflation).
lereserves  in  the face  of a  worsening  current  account  performance. 14
Table  3
Sierra  Leone,  selected  years
1981/82  - 1986/67
1978/79  1986,
-1980/81  81/82  83/84  85/86  2nd  half
(average)
Tax  Revenues  as
Z of GDP  15.2  11.4  6.6  5.5
Growth  rate (2):
Monetary  Base*  18.0  30.3  37.5  83.4
Consumer  Prices  17.0  25.1  78.7  70.4  200+**
*  The  monetary  base is  defined  as  the  sum  of commercial  bank reserves
(including  cash),  currency  outside  banks,  and  net claims  on the  government  by
commercial  banks. Average  growth  rates  are  computed  from  the  end  of the
preceding  period  to the  end  of the final  period  (e.g.,  the  78/79-80/81  average
uses  end-1977  and  end-1981  as endpoints).
**  The  CPI  grew 74  percent  between  June  and  December,  1986. The implied
annual  inflation  rate  is over  200  percent.
SOURCE:  World  Bank;  IMP,  International  Financial  Statistics  Yearbook,  1987.
Tax  performance  deteriorated  in  1981/82,  and increases  in the  monetary
base  began  to  be a  more important  source  of finance. Domestic  inflation
accelerated,  and  tax  revenues  declined  further  as a percentage  of GDP,  setting
up a Tanzi-style  interaction:  between  1981/82  and  1985/86,  the  domestic
inflation  rate  rose from  25 to 70  percent  per  year  and  tax  revenues  fell  from
11 to 5.5  percent  of GDP.  By the  end  of the  period,  the  country  was on a
14  The  terms  of trade  moved  strongly  against  Sierra  Leone  in  the  late
1970s  and  early  1980s:  the  prices  of coffee,  cocoa,  and  diamonds  all
collapsed,  and  the  price  of oil  rose.
11de-facto  floating  exchange  rate  regime.  with deficit-induced  increases  in the
nominal  monetary  base feeding  directly  through  to depreciation  of the  leone  on
the  parallel  market. With a  monetary  base of roughly  $50  million  at parallel
market  rates  and an inflation  rate  of 10  percent  per  month,  virtually  the
entire  average  monthly  deficit  of $4.5  billion  was  being  financed  by
seigniorage  in the  second  half  of 1986.  Since  the  real  monetary  base  was
shrinking  due to inflationary  expectations,  an increasing  inflation  rate  was
required  to continue  financing  the  same  real  deficit.
3.2  Budgetary  Fragility:  Asyrmutric  Expenditure.  Response
Host of the  poor  African  countries  rely  heavily  on the  export  of a few
primary  commodities. The  prices  of these  commodities  are  dominated  not  by
trend  but by successive  increases  and  decreases  of uncertain  duration. The
revenue  base in these  countries  therefore  typically  varies  a great  deal  due  to
fluctuations  in the  terms  of trade. This  section  discusses  the  problems  this
raises  for  the  intertemporal  allocation  of government  consumption  (current
expenditures).  For the  purposes  of this  section,  the  country  should  be
thought  of as speo±alized  in the  production  of its  export  good.  The  effects
described  here are  reinforced  if  expansionary  fiscal  policy  tends  to
appreciate  the  real  exchange  rate  (this  mechanism  is  discussed  in Section  4).
The experience  of  most countries  suggests  that  controlling  expenditure  in
the  face  of temporary  revenue  increases  is extremely  difficult. On the
economic  side,  output  growth  in these  economies  is chronically  constrained  by
shortages  of saving  and (at  official  exchange  rates)  foreign  exchange. On the
political  side,  the  power  base  of the  government  leadership  often  depends  on
its  ability  to dispense  economic  favors  (Lal  (1987),  Ndulu  (1986),  Nelson
12(1974)).  Revenue  windfalls  appear  to represent  loosenings  in these  key
macroeconomic and  political  constraints. Tanxi  (1982)  cites  limited
expenditure  control  a3 an important  factor  contributing  to fiscal  imbalances
in  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Kenya,  Malawi,  Sudan,  Zaire  and Zambia.
For  the  same  reasons,  reducing  expenditures  when revenues  fall  has  proven
extremely  difficult. 15 Countries  that  have  handled  commodity  booms  well  have
tended  to follow  policies  aimed  at  building  wealth  and  liquidity,  thereby
. towing  increases  in current  consumption  without  tightening  future
constraints. For  many countries,  however,  the  tendency  for  expenditures  to
expand  rapidly  with revenue  booms  and  to  contract  only  slowly  with revenue
declines  has  meant  a tendency  for  deficits  to -atchet  upwards  over  time (cf.
'Wheeler,  1984). This  process  can  continue  as long  as external  financing  is
available;  its  costs  become  apparent  in  the  contractionary  adjustment  that  is
ultimately  required.
If  the  duration  of commodity  price  fluctuations  were  known,  economic
theory  would indicate  increasing  assets  during  booms  and  depleting  them  during
bust  periods. Only  permanent  movements  in real  commodity  prices  would  change
the  country's  real  wealth  and  therefore  indicate  changes  in the sustainable
standard  of living. The actual  country  experience,  however  (e.g.,  Kenya  and
Madagascar  during  the  1976-77  coffee  boom,  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Ghana  during  the
1975-77  cocoa  and  coffee  boom,  Zambia  during  the  sustained  copper  boom  of
1965-74),  is full  of examples  where  windfall  revenue  gains  led  to large
15  In  a caLeful  study  of stabilization  programs  (including  Ghana,  Kenya
and  Zambia,  as  well as  countries  outside  of  Africa)  Nelson  (1974)  concludes
that  governments  find  cutting  deficits  to be the  most  difficult  part  of the
programs.
13increases  in  governn^nt  expenditures  (in  the  Zambian  case,  copper  financed  a
sustained  expansion  of  the  public  sector).  This  is  most  damaging  when  the
boom  produces  an  increase  in  current,  rather  than  capital,  government
expenditures.  Current  expenditures  (consumer  subsidies,  subsidies  to
parastatals,  public  sector  job  creation)  create  *entitlements'  to  public
sector  financial  support  that  are  extremely  difficult  to  cut  once  the
necessary  revenue  base  has  disappeared  (Lal,  1987).  Slow  response  of  current
expenditures  to  revenue  declines  can  then  create  a  situation  of  a  chronic
government  deficit.  sustained  appreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate  (see
Section  4),  and  an  increasing  foreign  debt.
In  theory,  government  expenditure  increases  are  not  a  problem  if  they  are
capital  expenditures;  the  income  from  the  acquired  domestic  asset  can  then  be
used  to  distribute  the  benefits  of  the  windfall  over  the  future.  In  many
cases,  capital  expenditures  indeed  rose  more  dramatically  than  current
expenditures  (e.g.,  The  Sudan  (Jaycox.  et  al.,  1986),  Madagascar  (Jeanneney,
1986),  Cote  D'Ivoire  (see  below)).  Experience  suggests  at  least  four  problems
here,  however.  The  first  and  most  important  is  that  the  domestic  capital
stock  is  illiquid.  Investment  projects  can  be  stopped  in  midstream,  but
capital  can  rarely  converted  into  consumption  when  the  terms  of  trade
collapse. 16
16  Presumably,  the  domestic  capital  stock  could  be  sold  to  foreigners;
however,  (1)  this  may  be  unattractive  on  political  grounds;  (2)  this  is
impossible  for  social  overhead  capital  like  transport  infrastructure  or
schools;  and  (3)  in  any  case,  assets  liquidated  in  this  fashion  are  likely  to
be  sold  at  a  substantial  discount  (an  example  is  Mexican  oil,  which  was  sold
to  the  United  States  at  well  under  the  market  value  in  connection  with  the
Mexican  financing  crisis  of  1982).  These  problems  would  not  be  decisive  if
the  country  could  borrow  against  illiquid  domestic  capital,  but  this  is  not
possible  for  most  countries  in  SSA.
14The  second  problem  is that  capital  expenditures  often  imply  a commitment
to future  current  expenditures  (e.g..  expenditures  on schools  or public
ttansport,  or subsidies  to  parastatals).  They  therefore  may build  in  the
asymmetric  expenditure  response  described  above. Third,  the  social  marginal
efficiency  of investment  is likely  to fall  rapidly  when capital  expenditures
rise  substantially  in a short  period  of time,  due  to inadequate  planning  and
coordination. The  final  problem,  in  historical  perspective,  is that  the
overall  performance  of  public  sector  investment  in low-income  Africa  has been,
with few  sceptions.  extremely  poor (World  Bank,  1981;  Jaycos,  et aL.,  1986).
This is especially  true  when the  investment  has  meant  expansion  of the scope
of public  sector  activities  in  product  and  resource  markets  (Ndulu,  1986),  an
observation  that is  corroborated  by the  experience  of oil  exporting  countries
in  handling  windfall  revenues  in the  1970s  (Gelb,  1986).
Figure  3 gives  an  example  of the  asymmetric  expenditure  response
phenomenon  from  Cote d'Ivoire. Public  expenditures  as  a fraction  of GDP  rose
gradually  from  1970  to 1975,  at a time  when  the  terms  of trade  was
deteriorating  by 40 percent;  by 1976,  the  public  sector  deficit  was 7  percent
of GDP.  The 1975-77  coffee  and  cocoa  boom  led  to  an extreme  short-run  terms
of trade  improvement  (these  commodities  represent  half  of Cote  d'Ivoire's
export  earnings). 17 Revenues  from  the  boom  turned  the  fiscal  balance  to
surplus  in 1977,  but this  was followed  by a sharp  increase  in expenditures
even  as  the  terms  of trade  collapsed  back  to the  1975  level. The  public
sector  deflcit  rose  steadily,  to 10  percent  of  GDP in 1982,  and  external  debt
rose  rapidly  (the  debt  service  ratio  rose  from  9.1  percent  in 1975  to 33.6
17  The  discussion  here draws  on Devarajan  and  de  Melo (1987b).
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j156percent  in 1962). The  government  entered  a stabilization-  cum-structural
adjustment  program  in 1981,  achieving  a substantial  turn-around  in the  fiscal
deficit  after  1982.  Stabilization  of the  fiscal  and  external  accounts  was
extremely  costly:  real  growth  stagnated  in  1981  and  then  fell  for  three
successive  years.
Problems  associated  with asymmetric  expenditure  adjustment  do  not  appear
to be confined  to the  public  sector  in low-income  Africa. Using  data  on 25
countries  in  SSA  between  1970  and  1980,  Wheeler  (1984)  finds  that  rea.  GDP
tends  to grow significantly  more slowly  on average  in  countries  with (1)  low
'ability  to retrench',  in  the  sense  that  imports  respond  less  to declines  in
export  revenues  than  to increases  in  export  revenues,  or (2)  high 'habit
formation,  in imports  of capital  goods  and  non-food  consumer  goods (where  high
habit  formation  means  high  dependence  of these  imports  on their  lagged
values). 18 Jaycox,  et al. (1986,  p.57)  identify  inability  to reduce  domestic
consumption  levels  downward  after  commodity  booms  as one  of the  key  common
denominators  in the  development  of the  debt  problem  in  Eastern  and  Southern
Africa.
There  are  relatively  few  examples  of successful  handling  of large
commodity  price  fluctuations  in low-lncome  Africa. The  main lesson  for  fiscal
policy  is  the  benefits  of conservatism  (Tanzi,  1982). In the  two  consistently
successful  cases,  Botswana  (beef  and  diamonds)  and  Cameroon  (cocoa,  coffee,
and oil),  governments  exercised  expenditure  restraint  in  periods  of commodity
18  Note that  Wheeler's  measures  refer  to total  imports  and  exports,  not
public  sector  expenditures  and  revenues. Interestingly,  Wheeler's  results
suggested  a  relatively  high 'ability  to retrench'  for  Cote  d'lvoire  (6th  in a
sample  of 29 countries).  On the  other  hand,  Cote  d'$voire  also showed
relatively  high  persistence  in imports  of non-food  consumer  goods  and
above-median  persistence  in capital  goods  imports  (Wheeler,  1984).
16boom,  and  a  substantial  portion  of revetwes  were  used  to increase  the liquid
net foreign  assets  of  the  government.  In Botuwana,  international  reserves
have  grown  steadily  since  the initiation  of diamond  production  in  the  Jwaneng
mine in  1983;  they  now stand  at over  two  years  of imports. In  Cameroon,  up to
75  percent  of oil  revenues  from  the  post-1978  boom  were saved  abroad,  partly
in  a retirement  of part  of government  debt (Devarajan  and  de  Melo,  1987b). In
both  cases,  these  countries  entered  the  mid-1980s  with low  debt  burdens,
sustainable  configurations  of government  and  private  expenditure,  and  an
ability  to  confront  potential  future  terms  of trade  deteriorations.
3.3  Budgetary  Fragilitys  Wages  and  Productivity
Sections  3.1  and  3.2  both suggest  that  expenditure  control  is important
for  budgetary  stability  in SSA. This section  argues  that  the  way in  which
expenditures  are  altered  may  make  a difference  to the  success  of a
stabilization  effort.
In  many  countries,  fiscal  stabilization  means  attempting  to  cut  the
public  sector  wage  bill. 19 Given  the  political  difficulty  of cutting  public
sector  employment,  this  is often  done  by holding  the  growth  of public  sector
wages  below  the inflation  rate,  and thus  "inflating  away"  the  real  public
sector  wage.  In  some  countries,  this  process  has driven  public  sector  real
wages  down well below  subsistence. In  Zaire,  for  example,  a month's  average
public  sector  salary  in  July,  1984  would  buy  enough  manioc  (a  staple)  to feed
the  average  family  for  a  month;  in  Ghana,  a  middle-level  public  sector  salary
19  For  example,  in  a  sample  of  94 DMF-supported  ajustment  programs
undertaken  during  the  period  1980-84  (not  restricted  to  Africa),  381  included
limits  on the  growth  of  public  sector  wages  and  salaries  (IMF,  1986,  p.14).
17in 1985  was at the  poverty  line  for  the  average  household.
Evidence  is  accumulating  that  reductions  in  public  sector  real  wages  may
make  a limited  contribution  to fiscal  stabilization  at best. 20 The  problem  is
that  driving  down real  public  sector  wages  may reduce  public  sector
productivity  in a  variety  of  ways.  Figures  4-6  give  a simple  example  that
illustrates  the  possible  implications  of this  point.  Suppose  that  public
sector  employees  divide  their  labor  time  between  the  government  job  and  the
informal  labor  market (e.g.,  driving  a taxi  or cultivating  crops)  in  order  to
maximize  their  expected  real  income. Suppose  further  that  while  it is
politically  difficult  to fire  a public  servant  on  budgetary  grounds,  it is
easier  to do so if there  is  direct  evidence  that  he has been *shirking'  the
job.  If a  fraction  s  of labor  time  is spent  on the  public  sector  job,  and  the
probability  of being *caughtm  (and  therefore  losing  the  government  job)  is
q(s).  with q'(s)  <  0 and  q"(s)  >  0, the  worker's  expected  income  is
(4)  (1  - s)wpri  +  P(s)Wpub
where  wpri is the  private  sector  real  wage,  wpub is the  government  real  wage,
and  p(s) - (l-q(s))  is the  probability  of retaining  the  government  job.  The
optimal  choice  of s  satisfies  p'(s)  - 1/KC.  where DC-  wpublwpri  is the  public
20  This  evidence  is still  anecdotal. In Tanzania,  for  example,  a policy
of  wage restraint  drove  the  real  public  sector  wage down  by 12 percent  per
year  between  1975  and  1982.  Since  public  sector  employment  grew  by 1OZ  a  year
over  the  same  period,  this  meant  a  steady  reduction  in the  real  wage bill.
Over  the  same  period,  however,  real  revenues  dropped  even  more rapidly  than
recurrent  expenditures  (this  may  have  been  partly  due  to shifts  in the
composition  of taxes  away  from  export  taxes  on incentive  grounds). The
government  therefore  had  limited  success  in stabilizing  the  budget  after  the
large  temporary  increase  in  military  expenditures  in 1978;  the  reductions  that
did  occur  required  large  cuts  in the  development  budget. More research  on the
Tanzanian  and  other  cases  would  be extremely  useful.
18sector  real  wag8 premium. Figure  4 gives  a configuration  of  p(s) in  which  the
elasticity  of p(s) falls  rapidly.  then  slowly,  then  rapidly  again,  as s
approaches  1.  This  implies  that  the  allocation  of time  to the  government  job,
*(K),  has  the  shape  given  in  Figure  5.  For  high  levels  of V.  effort*  falls
slowly  with reductions  in the  premium. As the  premium  falls  further,  however,
it  becomes  worthwhile  on the  margir  to switch  more rapidly  into informal
sector  work.  At low  levels  of the  premium,  effort  is  already  low  and  falls
slowly  to zero  as the  premium  approaches  zero. 21
*Effective'  labor  in the  public  sector  is simply  E - s(C)L,  where  L is
public  sector  employment.  Assuming  that  revenue,  R, is a function  of
effective  labor  (it  may also  depend  on government  expendltures,  0), the
government  deficit  is given  by
(5)  D(oD,L)  - G +  wpriL  - R(E).
To capture  the  notion  of increasing  but  diminishing  returns  to effective
labor,  I  assume  that  government  revenues,  R, are  an increasing,  concave
function  of effective  labor  input:  RE > 0, REE  0.  For  convenience,  I  will
assume  that  other  government  expenditures,  G, are  unaffected  by changes  in  5;
in reality,  reductions  in  effective  public  sector  labor  input  are likely  to
21  Since  the  worker  can  choose  voluntarily  to quit  the  government  job,
the  optimal  chice  of intensity,  s,  should  maximize  expected  income  in (4)
subject  to the  restriction  that  this  expected  income  exceed  wpri.  This  does
not  change  the  analysis,  although  some  form  of non-wage  compensation  from  the
government  job,  with real  value  v >  o,  must  be introduced  to rationalize  the
empirical  abservation  of individuals  retaining  their  jobs  even  when m  hat
fallen  below  1.  In this  case,  the  worker  would  choose  s to  maximize  V - (1  -
s)wpri  +  p(s)(wnub  + v), subject  to  V >  wpri.  The  optimal  chioce  of s,
s*(w,v),  would  look  like  s(()  in  Figure  5 for  s  above  some  cutoff  value wc
that  would  be a  decreasing  fun:tion  of v;  below  WC, 8*  would  be zero.  The
relevant  range  for  the  analysis  would  be above c.
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real  government  output  (for  example,  by requiring  increased  inputs  of  costly
outside  consultants  to  perform  managerial  and  other  functions). This
mechanism  would  reinforce  the  revenue  effect  described  here.
Figure  6 shows  the  deficit  as a function  of the  premium,  given  the  value
of the  private  real  wage and  the  level  of public  sector  employment.  The
diagram  suggests  that  there  is  an *optimal'  level  of the  premium,  in the  sense
of one  that  minimizes  the  deficit  given  the  level  of  public  sector  employment.
In the  neighborhood  of the  deficit-minimizing  premium,  the  deficit/public
sector  wage relationship  is  characterized  by a reverse  *Laffer  curve'. To the
left  of  k*, reductions  in  the  premium  have a  perverse  effect  on the  deficit:
they  drive  down revenue  productivity  sufficiently  to offset  the  saving  from
the  reduced  wage bill.
This  analysis  raises  the  broader  question  of 'how'  to  help stabilize  the
budget  by reducing  the  wage  bill.  Figure  7 shows  that  this  depends  very  much
on the  initial  levels  of employment  and  the  public  sector  premium. The  family
of rectangular  hyperbolas  in the  diagram  give  values  of o and  L that  yield
constant  government  wage bills. A policy  of reducing  the  public  sector  wage
bill  means  moving  to a  lower  hyperbola. The  deficit  reaches  a  minimum  value
of D* at ((*  L*). 22 I assume  that  the  deficit  is a strictly  concave  function
of ocand  L in  the  neighborhood  of this  point,  so  that  the  optimum  is locally
unique. The  contours  D1 and  D2 correspond  to combinations  of  O  and  L that
yield  successively  higher  deficit  levels  D1 and  D2, respectively  (D 2 > DI >
D*)
22  In the  model  just  described,  the  optimum  is  characterized  by the
condition  that  the  elasiticity  of effective  labor  with respect  to the  wage is
unity.  This  occurs  at  w* (independently  of  L) in  Figure  2.
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20W&Now  consider  starting  at a  point  like  A and trying  to reduce  the  deficit
by reducing  the  wage bill.  At  A,  public  sector  employlent  is too  high  and  the
real  public  sector  wage (relatively)  too  low  for  the  optimum;  this  position
was certainly  reached,  for  example,  in Ghana  in the  late  19709  and  early
1980s.23 In this  case,  it is  clear  that  reductions  in the  wage bill  through
erosion  of the  public  sector  premium  will increase  the  deficit  (point  B in the
diagram);  we are  on the  wrong  side  of the  wage-premium  Laffer  curve. In order
for  a reduction  in the  wage bill  to reduce  the  deficit,  it  must be done
through  a  shrinkage  of public  sector  employment  (a  movement  to a  point  like
C).
Although  we have  assumed  zero  growth  in real  GDP  for  simplicity,  it is
clearly  not  the  absolute  employment  level,  but  the  level  relative  to the  real
tax  base that  matters  for  public  sector  productivlty.  A movement  downwards  in
Figure  7  can  therefore  be achieved  simply  by restricting  the  growth  rate  of
public  sector  employment  relative  to overall  real  income  growth  (e.g.,  by
holding  employment  constant  as real  GDP rises). This  task  should  be
politically  easier  than  reducing  the  work  force  directly.  One way  a  reduction
in  employment  growth  might  be  achieved  is  by  removing  implicit  or  explicit
guarantees  of employment  for  graduates  of universities  and government  training
institutions,  as  is  being  done  in  Kenya  (Republic  of  Kenya,  1986,  p.33).
The  model  just  outlined  suggests  a number  of lessons  and  a caveat  or two
for  the  design  of  fiscal  stablILzation  schemes. First,  it is  clear  that
public  sector  wage bill  reductions  may  have  unlntended  effects  if there  is  a
wage/productivity  link  in  the  public  sector. Second,  since  such  links  operate
23  Between  1975  and 1982,  total  civil  service  employment  in  Ghana  grew
by 14 percent  a year  on average. Over that  same  period,  total  real
expenditures  on personal  emoluments  fell  at a rate  of 15  percent  a  year.
21through  labor  supply  decisions,  the relevant  wage  concept  is the  after-tax
wage.  This  means  that  tax  policy  may be a useful  instrument. 24 Finally,  if
wagelproductivity  links  are  important,  the  appropriate  fiscal  response
requires  an understanding  of the  exact  nature  of the  link. Our  model
emphasizes  the relative  return  to undifferentiated  *labor in the  public  and
informal  private  sectors. An alternative  mechanism  that  has  been  identified
in a  number  of countries  is  compression  of the  wage structure  within  the
public  sector. In Ghana,,for  example,  pre-tax  wage differentials  between  the
lowest  and  highest-paid  civil  servants  had shrunk  to 2:1  by 1985 (a  typical
ratio  for  other  developing  countries  would  be well over  6tl);  the  comparable
ratio  for  the  private  sector  was 10:1.  Thus  while  real  wages  at the  lower  end
of the salary  spectrum  had risen  in real  terms  since  1980,  the  real  salary  of
a  Permanent  Secretary  had fallen  to 10  of its  1977  level.
Compression  of  wage differentials  has  two important  implications.  First,
it implies  that  migration  of  public  sector  labor  into  the  private  sector  (as
outlined  in the  model  above)  and  abroad  may  be a  more severe  problem  at the
higher  levels  of the  civil  service,  so that  the  average  quality  of government
labor  declines  over time  (e.g.,  Republic  of  Kenya,  1986,  p.32).  Second,  it
adds  another  dimension  to the  efficiency  wage issue. As long  as  promotions
within  the  public  service  are  to some  degree  contingent  on actual
productivity,  work intensity  will respond  not  only  to the  average  public
sector  premium  but  also  to the  prospect  of higher  future  salaries  within  the
24  Although  the  average  tax  rate  is all  that  matters  for  computing  the
net  wage bill,  it is  marginal  tax  rates  that  are likely  to  matter  for
productivity.  Noce  also  that  it is  really  after-tax  compensation  that
matters,  so  policy  with respect  to non-wage  forms  of compensation  is  also
important.
22public  sector. In this  case, *dc-compressing'  the  public  sector  wage scale  by
raising  salaries  at the  high end  may  not  be as  destabilizing  as it seems;  part
of the  wage increase  can  be paid for  by increased  productivity  of the  most
able (and  therefore  upwardly  mobile)  workers  at the  lower  end  of the  pay
scale.
A particular  caveat  applies  when  productivity  is  to be increased  by  wage
scale  decompression:  since  the  productivity  increases  are  based  on the
prospect  of future  rewards,  the  government's  commitment  to a revised  pay scale
must  be visible  and  credible. A half-hearted  gesture  in the  direction  of
increased  salary  differentials  will fail  to increase  productivity.  Skepticism
in this  case  may be self-validatings  limited  progress  on productivity  will
increase  the  pressure  for  the  authorities  to renege  on the revised  salary
scale  25
There  are few  countries,  as yet,  in  which  improvement  and decompression
of the  public  sector  wage scale  has  been  an explicit  goal  of structural
adjustment  policy. Ghana  is  one  one  of the  pioneers  in this  respect:  the
first  set  of  public  sector  salary  adjustments,  in late  1984  and 1985,  affected
average  salaries  by raising  salaries  at the  lower  end;  salary  measures
implemented  in 1986  then  began  to  address  the  compression  problem  by
increasing  the  maximum  differential  to  5.7:1  from  2.3:1. The  effects  of these
measure:  have  not yet  been fully  assessed.
The  problem  of falling  public  sector  productivity  is cited  widely  enough
in the  literature  on SSA  to suggest  that  it is  endemic. The "efficiency  wage"
25  In other  words,  there  may be  more than  one  equilibrium  outcome  to the
policy,  depending  on credibility. This  phenomenon  is  an important  lesson  of
the  literature  on the  Southern  Cone  stabilization  programs.
23phenomenon  outlined  here is  one source  of the  problem,  but there  are  others. 26
This  suggests  that  there  would  be  high payoff  to studies  by countries  and
donor  agencies  of the  technology  of government  activity. More  broadly,  for
countries  in stabilization  or structural  adjustment  programs,  the  issue  is  not
whether  to reduce  the  fiscal  deficit  or the  scope  of public  sector  activities,
but  how this  is  best to  be done.
4.  Fiscal  Policy  and  Structural  Adjustment
A  basic  goal  of structural  adjustment  in  SSA is  reducing  the  anti-trade,
anti-agriculture  bias in  economic  policy  built  up over  the  1970s. Fiscal
policy  fits  directly  into  this  discussion  at three  points. First,  the
liberalization  component  of structural  adjustment  programs  may  have
destabilizing  effects  on the  fiscal  balance  in the  short  run.  This  heightens
the  need for  fiscal  discipline. Second,  the  large  share  of the  government  in
total  absorption  means that  its  expenditure  patterns  have a strong  influence
on the relative  price  of raded  and  nontraded  goods,  i.e.,  the real  exchange
rate. This  effect  of fiscal  policy  is important  because  the  promotion  of
traded  goods  production  is  a policy  goal  on such  grounds  as restoring
creditworthiness  with official  and  private  lenders  and  capturing  'learning  by
26  For  example,  falling  real  wages  may increase  the temptation  for
corruption  by government  officials.  If such  corruption  takes  the  form  of
accepting  bribes  in return  for  a reduction  of tax  liability,  the  deficit  may
again  move  perversely  with real  wage cuts.  This  is strengthened  if  corrupt
practices  require  an input  of time  from  the  official. An interesting  case  is
where  falling  real  wages  encourage  public  sector  officials  who are
administering  official  controls  (e.g.,  allocating  import  licenses)  to  accept
bribes. Here,  the  corruption  simply  involves  a transfet  of rents  from  the
private  sector  to the  public  official,  with  no budgetary  implications;  and in
fact,  the  institution  of a *market,  for  the  rent  may  have  positive  benefits  in
terms  of allocative  efficiency.
24doing  ezternalities  in  the  export  sector  (van  Wijnbergen,  1986). Fiscal
policy  has  a role  in  whether,  and  how  rapidly,  the  desired  sectoral
reallocation  of resources  is  achieved. Finally,  reducing  the scope  of public
sector  activities  and  focusing  these  activities  in areas  of high social  return
is itself  a goal  of structural  adjustment  programs.
4.1  Fiscal  Policy  and  the  Real  Exchange  Rate
For  a country  taking  world  prices  of imports  and  exports  as given,
increases  in domestic  expenditure  relative  to income  tend  to put  upward
pressure  on the  price  of  nontradeable  goods  relative  tQ tradeables. 27 This  is
the  message  of a long line  of  work in the  tradition  of the  Australian
dependent  economy  model (e.g.,  Dornbusch  (1980)). Since  expansionary  fiscal
policy  lowers  net  domestic  saving  unless  private  saving  offsets  the  fall  in
public  sector  saving,  it is  often  associated  with real  appreciation.  In fact,
even if  government  deficits  are  not financed  externally,  a substitution  of
public  for  private  absorption  may  put  pressure  on the  real  exchange  rate  if
the  composition  of government  expanditures  is  weighted  more heavily  towards
nontraded  goods.
None  of the real  exchange  rate  movements  just  described  are  harmful  if
they  occur  in  the  context  of sustainable  macroeconomic  policies. A future
real  depreciation  would  be  called  for,  for  example,  if  external  borrowing  were
used  to  smooth  consumption  in the  current  period,  or  to  undertake  investment
27  More generally,  exp-nsions  in domestic  expendLture  will tend  to  raise
the  relative  price  of any  good  that  is consumed  on the  margin  and is
imperfectly  substitutable  with tradeable  goods  (see  Devarajan  and  de Melo,
1987).
25in the  nontraded  goods  sector;  but in either  case,  the real  depreciation  would
generate  the  increase  in  traded  goods  for  debt  service  wtthout  any  special
need for  accompanying  fiscal  policy.
For  much of low-income  Africa,  however,  the  appreciation  of real  exchange
rates  that  took  place  in the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s  was the  counterpart  to
unsustainable  economic  policies. In this  context,  fiscal  policy  may have  a
role  to  play in facilitating  real  devaluation.  The resulting  move  of
resources  into  the  production  of tradeables  can shorten  the  contractionary
phase  of stabilization  and  adjustment  programs. Fiscal  policy  can  work  here
either  by helping  to  validate  a  nominal  devaluation  (Khan  and  Lizondo,  1987)
or,  especially  if the  nominal  exchange  rate  is  not available  as a  policy  tool
(as  in  the franc  zone)  in accelerating  the  adjustment  of relative  prices
(Krumm,  1987;  Devarajan  and  de  Melo,  1987).
4.2  Aid and  the  Real Exchange  Rate
van  Wijnbergen  (1987)  argues  that  aid inflows,  like  capital  inflows  or
terms  of trade  windfalls,  can  increasi  the  demand  for  nontraded  goods  and
therefore  appreciate  the  real  exchange  rate. This  relative  price  movement
would  be appropriate  if  changes  in  aid levels  were  permanent  and  there  were  no
distortions  in the  economy. In this  case,  resources  should  move into  the
nontraded  goods  sector  in  order  to translate  the  economy's  permanent  increase
in  command  over  traded  goods  into  increased  consumption  of  both traded  and
nontraded  goods. If the  aid  windfall  is temporary,  however,  and  the  private
sector  does  not  operate  in  a perfect  capital  market,  then  the resulting  real
appreciation  may (1)  lead  to suboptimal  investment  in the  traded  goods  sector,
and/or  (2)  worsen  the  social  cost  of existing  intersectoral  distortions  (cf.
26Neary  and  van  Wijnbergen,  1986). One  distortion  of  particular  importance  to
low-income  Africa  is  the  possibility  that  the  export  sector  may generate
positive  externalities  either  for  the rest  of the  economy  or for  future
production  in the  export  sector  (learning by doing"). A  distortion  of this
type  would  call  for  intervention  in the  form  of an export  subsidy  regardless
of the  level  of aid  inflows. If  capital  markets  are imperfect,  however,  the
level  of the  optimal  subsidy  is a  positive  function  of the  level  of temporary
aid  or other  foreign  capital  inflows  (van  Wijnbergen,  1986).
A  second,  related  negative  effect  of aid  inflows  has  been to  help support
fiscal  policies  that  were  otherwise  unsustainable  (Ndulu,  1986).28 To the
degree  that  postponement  of adjustment  makes  the  ultimate  adjustment  more
difficult,  intertemporal  welfare  may  be lowered;  more importantly,  the
uncertain  duration  of policies  supported  by  widespread  controls  and  external
borrowing  can increase  uncertainty  enough  to  paralyze  private  sectcr
investment.
van  Wijnbergen  (1986)  provides  suggestive  empirical  evidence  in the  form
of equations  linking  the  real  exchange  rate  to aid  inflows  and  such  other
'structural  determinants'  as total  factor  supplies  (proxied  by real  GDP),
differential  technological  progress,  and  nonconcessional  borrowing  inflows.
In separate  time-series  regressions  for  Egypt  and  five  low-income  countries  in
SSA,  elastic:*ies  of the  real  exchange  rate  with respect  to current  or lagged
28  Temporary  aid  inflows  are  analytically  similar  to commodity  booms
when the  booming  sector  is an  enclave  that  does  not  draw  resources  from  the
rest  of the  economy  (e.g.,  diamonds  in Botswana). The  discussion  of
asysmetric  expenditure  response  to commodity  booms (Section  3.2) is therefore
relevant  here.  There  may  be examples,  in other  words,  where  aid inflows
actually  precipitated  unsustainable  fiscal  policies,  rather  than simply
helping  sustain  them  in the  short  run. I am  not aware  of any  evidence  on this
issue  in the  literature.
27aid  disbursements  fall  between  .17  and .70  and  are  typically  statistically
significant.29  While these  results  should  be interpreted  cautiously,  given
simultaneity  problems  (real  exchange  rate  appreciation  increases  the  need for
aid  by worsening  export  performance  and  reducing  real  incomes),  they  suggest
that  the  phenomenon  may  be quantitatively  important  in SSA.
To observe  that  aid inflows  may appreciate  the  real  exchange  rate  is  not
to say  that  the shadow  value  of temporary  aid  is  negative. Aid  inflows  can
play  a crucial  role  on the  supply  side  of the  economy  by loosening  import
constraints  and increasing  capacity  utilization  in  both the  traded  and  the
nontraded  goods  sector. With regard  to  sectoral  resource  allocation,  to the
degree  that the  supply  effects  of Olumpys  public  sector  infrastructural
investments  are  biased  towards  traded  goods  (e.g.,  road  improvements  for
transport  of agricultural  goods),  aid  flows  that  make these  investments
possible  can  hasten  the  shift  of resources  out  of nontradeables.  It does
suggest,  however,  that  both recipients  and  donors  face  a serious aid
management problem. While  continued,  and  even  increased  aid  is essential,
both  groups  should  treat  aid  flows  as temporary  and  rehabilitative,  and
confront  the  necessary  implication  that  availability  of these  flows  does  not
lessen  the  need for  structural  adjustment. 30
29  The  five  SSA  countries  are  Ghana,  Kenya,  Malawi,  Sierra  Leone,  and
Tanzania.
30  van  Wijnbergen  (1986)  suggests  that  donors  should  include
conditionality  with respect  to removal  of anti-trade  bias  as a  way of
counteracting  the  effect  of aid  on sectoral  allocation  of resources. This
policy  would  be complementary  to targeting  aid  towards  removing  supply
constraints  and signalling  clearly  to the  private  sector  the  temporary  nature
of aid  so as to facilitate  medium-run  decision  making.
285.  Fiscal  Policy  and  StabilLuation
Balance  of payments  stabilization  problems  have  been a  constant  theme  for
countries  in SSA  since  the  mid-19709. Two  lessons  for  fiscal  policy  seem
important. The  first  is the  importance  of control  over  the  public  sector
deficit. The  second  is the  importance  of redirecting  government  expenditures
so as to shift  the  burden  of stabilization  away  from  aggregate  demand
contraction.  We discuss  these  in turn.
Deficits  cannot  be financed  externally  in  crisis  periods,  and  domestic
borrowing  is in  any  case from  the  baiking  system. Public  sector  deficits
therefore  mean increases  in  domestic  credit  and  the  monetary  base.  Since
stabilization  of pr'ces  (including  the  exchange  rate)  and/or  the  balance  of
payments  requires  control  over  the  growth  of the  nominal  monetary  base
relative  to the  demand  for  it.  controlling  the  public  sector  deficit  is  a
potentially  important  input. The  basic  insight  here is  simply  the  monetary
approach  to the  balance  of payments  (or  the  exchange  rate),  and  in fact
control  of government  expenditures  and  the  overall  deficit  are  standard
features  of IMP  stabilization  packages  applied  throughout  the  developing
world. 31 A number  of  observations  are  suggested  by the  particulars  of the  SSA
case.
First,  much attention  has  been  devoted  to the  need for  countries  in SSA
to  move towards  more  market-related  exchange  rates  (e.g.,  World  Bank,  1981).
In practice,  this  has  meant  experimentation  with foreign  exchange  auctions  and
31  A  survey  of 94 Fund  adjustment  programs  supported  by Stand-By
Arrangements  or the  Extended  Fund  Facility  between  1980  and  1984  found  that  91
percent  included  restraint  of government  current  expenditure.  LimLts  on bank
credit  to the  central  government  were  included  in 53  percent  of the  programs,
and  measures  to improve  or reform  tax  administration  in 55  percent  (ItM,
1986).
29other  devices  for  reducing  disparities  between  official  and  parallel  exchange
rates. Any tendency,  however,  to  view exchange  rate  flexlbllity  as a
substitute  for  fiscal  dlsclpllne  in stabilizatLon  policy  rvns  the  risk  that
defLcLt-induced  money  growth  will lead  to an intolerable  degree  of
depreciation  and  thus  termlnate  the  program. The  importance  of accompanylng,
or even  prior,  fiscal  control  ls  amply  lllustrated  by the  relative  success  of
Ghana  and  the  dlfflcultles  encountered  by Zambla  and  Sierra  Leone  in  adopting
more flexible  exchange  rate  regimes  as part  of stabilizatLon  efforts. 32
Second,  as the  data in  Table  1 suggest,  countrles  in SSA  have few  options
other  than  contraction  for  achieving  stabilizttLon  (Nelson  (1974)). In
particular.  these  countrles  have limlted  capacLty  to stabiliLe  their  external
accounts  ln the  short  run  by increasing  the  supply  of tradeable  goods. Thus
whlle  economlc  contraction  ls  never  the  stated  goal  of fiscal  restraLnt,  lt
has in  many cases  been  the  primary  mechanism  for  actually  achieving
stabilization.
This  brLngs  us to the  second  lesson,  which  is the  importance  of
redirecting  government  expenditures  so  as to  maximLze  the  contribution  of
supply  Lncreases  to stabilization.  In a  number  of countries  (e.g.,  Tanzania,
Zambia),  infrastructural  conditions  are  poor  enough  to  constitute  an important
constraLit  on the  supply  of tradeables,  particularly  in transport-  lntensive
sectors  like  agrlculture.  In these  countrles,  there  may  be conslderable  scope
for  the  government  to lower  the  social  cost  of stabllization  by focusing  on
32  The success  of Zaire  in  sustaining  movLng  to a relatively  stable
market-determined  exchange  rate  is  also  a case  in  polnt;  a  fiscal  austerity
program  was already  in  place  nine  months  before  the lnitial  devaluation  (Sept.
1983)  and  move to a  dual  exchange  rate  regime;  the  deficit  fell  from  lOS to  4S
of  CDP in 1983.  The  exchange  rate  was successfully  unified  in  February  of
1984.
30the  elimination  of distribution  and  supply  bottlenecks.
Finally,  the fragility  of the  fiscal  balance  (Section  3.2)  suggests  that
fiscal  discipline  may be important  in dealing  with the  potentially
destabilizing  effects  of structural  adjustment  programs. As Lal  puts it,
drawing  on the  experience  with liberalization-cum-stabilization  programs  in
the  Southern  Cone and  Sri  Lanka, prior  establishment  of fiscal  control  is the
'sine  qua  non"  of a  sustainable  liberalization  attempt"  (1987,  p.284). Given
the importance  of trade  taxes  in SSA (cf.  Table  2),  a reduction  in  government
intervention  in traded  goods  markets  may involve  a substantial  shock  to the
fiscal  balance. 33
6.  Conclusions
Although  judgements  are  difficult  to  make given  the  variety  and
complexity  of fiscal  policy  problems  in low-income  Africa,  this  preliminary
review  suggests  the following  conclusions:
1.  Various  factors  combine  to  make the  fiscal  balance  in  many low-income
African  countries  sensitive  to external  shocks. Addressing  these  factors
fully  is a  medim  term  prospect  that  will require  study  of the "technology"  of
the  public  sector  in specific  countries.
2.  Public  sector  labor  productivity  is an  endemic  problem  in  SSA.  This is
33  The impact  on revenues  is  moderated  to some  degree  if currency
devaluation  is  simultaneously  taking  place,  since  the  depreciation  of the
domestic  currency  raises  the  domestic  currency  value  of trade  flows;  a
devaluation  will also increase  the  value  of debt  service  and  expenditures  on
traded  goods.  however.
31almost  certainly  related  to falling  real  public  sector  wages  and  wage
differentials,  which  have reduced  the  return  to  public  sector  job  performance
relative  to  private  sector  work or to on-the-job  corruption  or moonlighting.
In some  cases,  public  sector  wages  have fallen  so low  that  the  positive
productivity  effect  of an increase  would  be enough  actually  to reduce  the
overall  deficit.
3.  Commodity  booms  have  been  a  mixed  blessing  for  countries  in  SSA.  The
record  suggests  that  public  sector  investment  is  a poor substitute  for  the
more  conservative  strategy  of increasing  liquid  foreign  assets  in response  to
revenue  booms.
4.  Aid  donors  and  recipients  in SSA  face  a serious  'aid  management*  problem.
Aid inflows  can  certainly  help sustain,  or even  encourage,  overly  expansive
fiscal  policies. There  is some  evidence  that  aid  inflows  appreciate  the  real
exchange  rate.  Concentrating  on the  rehabilitative  and  infrastructural  role
of aid  will  maximize  the  contribution  of these  flows  to structural  adjustment;
there  may also  be room  for  conditionality  in  the  form  of removal  of anti-trade
policies  so  as to reduce  the  distortionary  cost  of aid  inflows.
5.  Prior  control  of fiscal  deficits  is  important  to the  success  of
stabilization  programs. This  lesson  has  been  particularly  dramatic  in recent
programs  involving  movements  to  market-oriented  exchange  rates.
6.  Realignment  of government  expenditures  towards  provision  of inputs  that
are  complementary  to private  sector  inputs  (e.g.,  towards  rehabilitation  of
32transport  services)  has  an important  role  to  play in shortening  and  softening
the  contractionary  phase  of stabilization/structural  adjustment  programs.
7.  Fiscal  policy  was an important  factor  contributing  to the  real
appreciations  that  occurred  since  the  mid-1970s5  by the  same  token,  it  has  a
role  to  play in facilitating  the  real  depreciation  that is required  for
adjustment. In  particular,  nominal  devaluations  will not  produce  real
devaluations  in the  medium  run  without  fiscal  adjustment. Fiscal  policy  is
particularly  important  for  the  real  exchange  rate  in the  Franc  Zone  given  the
absence  of the  nominal  exchange  rate  instrument.
33Table  1
Export  Share  Growth  of
Real  GDP Growth  of  GDP  Real  GDI*
1965-80  1980-85  1965-80  1980-85  1965-80  1980-85
SSA**  5.3  -0.7  25  21  9.0  -11.4
DC$***  6.0  3.3  13  21  8.2  0.8
Indez  of Food  Percent
Production  Share  of Food  Gross  International
per  Capita  in  Merchandise  Reserves
(79-81-100)  Imports  (months  of imports)
1983-85  1965  1985  1985
SSA**  107  15  18  1.7
DCs***  116  16  11  3.5
Debt  Service  as Percentage  of:
External  Exports
Debt/GDP  of Goods
Ratio  and  Services  GNP
1970  1985  1970  1985  1970  1985
SSA**  14.2  39.1  5.3  21.5  1.2  4.8
DCs***  13.5  31.5  11.2  19.7  1.5  4.3
*  GDI  denotes  Gross  Domestic  Investment.
**  Sub-Saharan  Africa. These  numbers  are  weighted  averages,  usually  weighted
by GDP.  Since  Nigeria  accounts  for  roughly  half  of GDP  of SSA,  it  has a large
influence  on the  numbers.
***  All  developing  countries.
Source:  World  Bank,  1987,  p.  204,  211.  209,  213,  225,  231,  239.
34Table  2
Average  Fiscal  Ratios  for  Africa  and




Share  of Central  Governmen.t  25-  25
Expenditures  and  Lending
Minus  Repayment  in  GDP
Share  of  Capital  Expenditures  24  19
in  Expenditures  and  Lending
Minus  Repayments
Share  of Taxes  in  GDP**  17  17
Share  of International  Trade  22++  16
Taxes  in  Revenue
Share  of  Nontax  Revenues  in  12-  21
Revenue
Share  of Grants  in  Revenue  3++  2
*  Sub-Saharan  Africa  plus  Morocco,  South  Africa  and  Tunisia. Since  the
averages  are  weighted  by (1980)  GDP,  they  are  heavily  influenced  by South
Africa,  Nigeria,  and  Morocco. The  pluses  and  minuses  indicate  the  probable
direction  of change  in the  average  if  these  countries  were also  omitted.
**  Calculated  as (Revenues/GDP)  minus  the  sum  of (Nontax  Revenues/GDP)  and
(Grants/GDP).
Source:  IM,  Government  Finance  Statistics  Yearbook,  1985.
35Appendix
An Accounting  Framework
The  balance  sheet  identity  for  the  central  bank  takes  the form 34
(Al)  EF  + DC-  +  RES +  NW  - H  +  NW
where  E is  the  nominal  exchange  rate (cedis  per  dollar),  F  is  dollar  foreign
exchange  reserves,  DC is  central  bank lending  to the  government,  C is
currency,  RES is reserves  of private  barks,  and  NW is  net  worth  of the  Central
Bank.  We  will assume  that  capital  gains  or losses  on foreign  exchange
reserves,  (dE/dt)  F, are  absorbed  in  net  worth  and  do  not therefore  affect  the
monetary  base  H.
Suppose  that  all  of the  external  debt  of the  economy  is  held  by the
fiscal  autaorities.  either  directly  or indirectly  through  parastatal
34  In the  Franc  Zone  and  SACU,  a single  central  bank is shared  by the
members  of the  monetary  union.  In  this  case,  the  union  central  bank  has  a
balance  sheet  of the  form
(*)  E  FP  +  YDCi - C  +  {RESi +  NW  - H + NW,
where i  iidexes  member  countries. FP is the  pooled  reserve  stock  of the
union,  anA  DCi  and  RESi  are  domestic  credit  to  country  i  and  deposits  of
country  i's  government  and  private  banking  sector  in  the  central  bank.
respectively.  The  balance  sheet  for  the  banking  sector  of country  i takes  the
form
(**)  DCGi  +  DCPi  +  NRES 1 +  EeXFi  - DD 1 NWi,
where  DD and  XF are  deposits  and  excess  (non-pooled)  foreign  exchange
reserves,  respectively,  DCG and  DCP  are  lending  to  the  domestic  government  and
private  sector,  and  NRES is  net  deposits  at  the  central  bank.
36enterprises. There  is  no domestic  market  for  government  bonds,  so the  nominal
non-interest  government  deficit,  G - T,  must be financed  by borrowing  either
from  the  central  bank  or from  external  sources,  or by external  grants,  R.
Using  dots  above  variables  to  denote  time  derivatives,  we therefore  have
(A2)  (G  - T)  - E R + i(E*F)  +  C + E*DEX  - id(E  DEX),
where  DEX  is the  country's  external  debt,  id is the  average  interest  rate  on
that  debt,  and i is  the  risk-free  interest  rate  in international  markets,
which is received  on reserves. The  value  of id is typically  below  L  for
sub-Saharan  Africa,  since  most  external  debt  is from  official  sources  at
concessional  rates.
Normalizing  by nominal  GDP C- Y) and substituting  for  DC from (A2),  we
get
(A)  g-t-r  - i/Y  +  E(DEX  - P)/Y - i(dex  - f)  - (id  _ i)dex,
where  g - G/Y, r  - E R/Y,  etc. 35 Finally,  using "'O  to denote  a logarithmic
growth  rate,  we get
(A4)  g-t-r  - (h+y+w)h  +  dexzdex  +  (i-id)dex
- f,f  - ([i+Z-WI-y)  (dex-f),
35  I  hve  assumed  in (5)  that  changes  in the  value  of international
reserves  due  to exchange  rate  movements  are  accounted  for  separately  by the
central  bank  and  do not  affect  high powered  money.
37where  iris  the  rate  of change  of P and  y  is real  GDP in terms  of the  domestic
consumption  basket  (y-Y/P). Decomposing  the  domestic  price  index,  the
quantity  ir-  Z  can  be  written  as the sum  of foreign  inflation  (inflation  in
the  foreign  currency  price  of imports)  and  a positive  linear  combination  of
the  rate  of improvement  in  the terms  of trade  and  the  rate  of real
appreciation  (the  latter  defined  as the  rate  of increase  of nontraded  goods
prices  relative  to traded  goods  prices). In this  case,  for  fixed  i,  either  a
real  appreciation,  a terms  of trade  improvement,  or an increase  in  world
inflation  will offset  debt service  by eroding  the  real  value  of the  debt  in
term  of the  domestic  consumption  basket  (cf.  Dornbusch  (1978)).
Equation  (M)  is  useful  in tracing  the  interaction  of  budget  deficits,
domestic  money growth,  and  debt  accumulation.  It states  that  budget  deficits
as a  share  of GDP are  financed  by seigniaorage  on the  domestic  currency,  growth
in  gross  external  debt  as  a  proportion  of  GDP,  and  the  concessional  element  in
interest  rates  on foreign  debt,  and  that  these  financing  inflows  must  also
cover  the  accumulation  of reserves  and  interest  payments  on the  net external
debt.  Note  that if  id is  interpreted  as the  promised  interest  rate  on
external  debt,  the  growth  in  external  debt  also  includes  increases  in arrears:
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